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Abstract.
A receiver-anonymous channel allows a sender to send a message to a receiver without an
adversary learning for whom the message is intended. Wireless broadcast channels naturally
provide receiver anonymity, as does multi-casting one message to a receiver population con-
taining the intended receiver. While anonymity and confidentiality appear to be orthogonal
properties, making anonymous communication confidential is more involved than one might
expect, since the ciphertext might reveal which public key has been used to encrypt. To
address this problem, public-key cryptosystems with enhanced security properties have been
proposed.
This paper investigates constructions as well as limitations for preserving receiver anonymity
when using public-key encryption (PKE). We use the constructive cryptography approach by
Maurer and Renner and interpret cryptographic schemes as constructions of a certain ideal
resource (e.g. a confidential anonymous channel) from given real resources (e.g. a broad-
cast channel). We define appropriate anonymous communication resources and show that a
very natural resource can be constructed by using a PKE scheme which fulfills three prop-
erties that appear in cryptographic literature (IND-CCA, key-privacy, weak robustness).
We also show that a desirable stronger variant, preventing the adversary from selective
“trial-deliveries” of messages, is unfortunately unachievable by any PKE scheme, no mat-
ter how strong. The constructive approach makes the guarantees achieved by applying a
cryptographic scheme explicit in the constructed (ideal) resource; this specifies the exact
requirements for the applicability of a cryptographic scheme in a given context. It also
allows to decide which of the existing security properties of such a cryptographic scheme
are adequate for the considered scenario, and which are too weak or too strong. Here, we
show that weak robustness is necessary but that so-called strong robustness is unnecessarily
strong in that it does not construct a (natural) stronger resource.
Keywords: public-key encryption, key privacy, robust encryption, anonymity, constructive
cryptography
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1 Introduction
Protocols and other mechanisms for protecting privacy often use cryptographic schemes in non-
standard ways, sometimes requiring such schemes to have cryptographic properties that go
beyond data authenticity and confidentiality. It is important that new cryptographic schemes
take these requirements into account and that designers of privacy protocols are aware which
cryptographic properties are needed in which situation. Several types of cryptographic schemes
have been investigated with a focus on anonymity. In “key-private” public-key encryption,
the ciphertext does not reveal information about the intended receiver [BBDP01, ABN10], in
private key exchange [Aba02, CK02, AF04] two parties can exchange a key without revealing
their identities, and “anonymous” signatures protect the signer’s identity at least as long as
parts of the signed plaintext remain hidden [YWDW06, Fis07]. In this paper, we focus on
public-key encryption and receiver anonymity.
The cryptographic community traditionally defines security notions for cryptographic schemes
such as encryption from a game-based perspective, i.e., one defines properties of schemes by
means of theoretical experiments, usually referred to as games. Though game-based definitions
are frequently used in cryptography and have been studied and improved over the years, they
have two major shortcomings. First, they model the use of a scheme abstractly and simplify it
to the interaction between an adversary and a so-called challenger (both in a sense artificial).
Consequently, the system-level security guarantees that one obtains by applying a provably
secure scheme in a specific context are usually not evident. Second, if an (encryption) scheme
proven secure in this way is used in a larger protocol, then the security of the full protocol can
only be proven by showing a reduction of breaking a certain security property of the underlying
(encryption) scheme to breaking the security of the protocol. Each such protocol requires in
principle its own tailor-made security reduction.
A fundamentally different approach to defining the security of cryptographic schemes has
been proposed by Maurer and Renner [MR11]. Following their constructive cryptography par-
adigm, one models both the resources assumed by a protocol or scheme and the desired func-
tionality explicitly, and the goal of the protocol is to construct (in a well-defined sense) the
desired resource from the assumed resources. For a public-key encryption scheme, for instance,
this means that one assumes an authenticated communication channel from the receiver to the
sender to transmit the public key, as well as an insecure channel from the sender to the receiver
to transmit the ciphertext. The goal of the scheme is to construct, from the assumed chan-
nels, a confidential communication channel (from sender to receiver, cf. [MS96]). The assumed
channels can either be physically realized or can themselves be constructed cryptographically,
and the resulting channel can directly be used in any application that requires such a channel.
Furthermore, as the constructive approach makes the guarantees of both the assumed and the
constructed resources explicit, it allows to capture the exact cryptographic assumptions required
for security.
Anonymity in constructive cryptography. In constructive cryptography, a network is
modeled as a resource that can be accessed by multiple (honest or dishonest) parties. The
parties access the resource through interfaces provided by the resource and specific to each
party; the interfaces specify exactly in which way each party can access the resource. In this
context, anonymity is an explicit guarantee of such a resource (e.g., a network). In particular, as
adversarial interaction with the network is also modeled by means of an interface (the attacker is
a dishonest party), the security (or privacy) guarantees of the underlying network are described
by the (absence of) capabilities of such an adversary.
For the particular case of receiver-anonymous communication, we model a network resource
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with multiple receiver interfaces. Whenever a sender inputs a message at its interface and
chooses a receiver, the network resource might leak certain information (such as the length of
the message or even the complete plaintext) at the adversary’s interface; however, the resource
will not reveal the receiver. The goal of a public-key encryption scheme in this context is to
construct a resource that will hide the receiver, while leaking no information on the message
contents apart from (potentially) the length.
We consider the case where encryption schemes are used for end-to-end encryption between
senders and receivers. For such protocols, anonymity cannot be created by employing a cryp-
tographic primitive. In fact, a constructive approach makes it apparent that schemes can only
preserve anonymity that is guaranteed by the underlying network, but never produce it.1 If
Alice sends a message to Bob over the Internet using Bob’s publicly known IP address, then
there is no hope for the encryption scheme (or key exchange protocol) to hide the fact that Bob
is the intended receiver of Alice’s message. In fact, encrypting messages potentially makes the
problem worse: Even if the transmission of the ciphertext is itself anonymous, the ciphertext
might still reveal under which public key it was encrypted.
Hence, in a constructive analysis of the end-to-end use of cryptographic schemes, we always
consider the preservation of anonymity. If the underlying network (one of the initial resources) is
insecure, but guarantees a certain level of anonymity, then an “anonymity-preserving” scheme
will improve the security while maintaining as much anonymity as possible. The obtained
guarantees are strong in that they hold regardless of the context, that is, of any prior knowledge
the adversary might have and of any protocols that are executed in parallel.
Our contributions. We provide a treatment of receiver anonymity in the context of public-
key encryption schemes from the perspective of constructive cryptography. In particular, we
show how anonymity is described as a feature of a communication resource, and we prove
which security properties of the underlying encryption scheme are necessary and/or sufficient to
achieve a confidential receiver-anonymous communication resource from a non-confidential, but
also receiver-anonymous one. (Schemes with these properties are known in the literature.) More
specifically we consider the following network resources (specified in more detail in Section 3.1):
• The insecure broadcast network / ,2 allowing a single sender to broadcast messages to
multiple receivers, and allowing the adversary to learn the entire message and to remove,
change, or inject messages;
• The confidential receiver-anonymous channel − ? / ••, which preserves both the confiden-
tiality of the message and the anonymity of the intended receiver, leaking only the length
of the message and allowing the adversary only to delete and honestly deliver messages,
and to inject different messages to chosen recipients.
We show that− ? / •• can be constructed from / and authenticated channels←−• (in an initial
step), by employing a secure (IND-CCA), key-private (IK-CCA), and weakly robust (WROB-
CCA) public-key encryption scheme. In fact, we show that constructing − ? / •• does not require
strong robustness (SROB-CCA)—a stricter property for anonymous secure encryption proposed
in [ABN10]. Naturally, using SROB-CCA public-key encryption also constructs − ? / ••; however,
this property is not required. In other words, the treatment in [ABN10] relies on slightly too
strong assumptions. Employing SROB-CCA security, however, does yield a tighter security
reduction.
1Note that this observation does not hold for active networks or overlay networks that can implement their own
multi-hop anonymous routing strategy for which encryption is in fact crucial. Buses [BD03] is a cryptographic
design exemplifying this, while TOR [DMS04] is the most widely used anonymity system based on this principle.
2In naming our resources we extend the •-notation of [MS96].
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Furthermore, we show that one (the only natural) channel providing stronger anonymity
than what we achieve with IND-CCA, IK-CCA, and WROB-CCA encryption cannot be achieved
by any encryption scheme at all (see Section 3.3). In other words, using e.g. the stronger prop-
erty of SROB-CCA encryption does not construct the stronger channel. Note that this does
not exclude that SROB-CCA may be a useful property in other scenarios; however, our results
indicate that simply improving the properties guaranteed by − ? / •• in a natural way cannot be
done by using SROB-CCA, or any other type of encryption.
Related work. The first definition of key-private public-key encryption appears in [BBDP01];
the goal of the primitive was to attain receiver anonymity. Abdalla et al. [ABN10] noted that
also robustness is needed for the PKE scheme to achieve this property, since otherwise an honest
receiver is unable to detect whether he is the intended recipient of a given ciphertext and could
obtain a bogus decryption. We explicitly describe the guarantees achieved without robustness
in the resource − $ / •• in Section 4.1. Mohassel [Moh10] analyzed game-based security and
anonymity notions for KEM-DEM encryption schemes, showing that, for this particular type
of composition, weak robustness together with the key privacy of the KEM (key-encapsulation
mechanism) and DEM (data-encapsulation mechanism) components is sufficient to obtain a
key-private hybrid public-key encryption scheme. Our result implies that weak robustness is
sufficient even for universal composition; a constructive formulation of KEM-DEM schemes is
currently being developed. However, as shown recently by Farshim et al. [FLPQ13] (even strong)
robustness is insufficient in certain contexts, such as Sako’s auction protocol. The same concept
(i.e., that only the intended recipient must be able to decrypt a ciphertext to a meaningful
plaintext) lies at the core of incomparable public keys in [WFS03].
More general (game-based) frameworks that mix the analysis of cryptographic schemes and
traffic-analysis resistance have been proposed in [HM08] and [OV11]. Independently, different
cryptographic [CL05, BGKM12] and traffic-analysis models [FJS07, FJS12] have been developed
for variants of onion routing. Whereas our work here does not consider traffic analysis explicitly,
our in-depth results can be composed with meaningful models of traffic analysis. We discuss
implications of our results for traffic analysis in Section 5.
In particular, we note that our confidential receiver-anonymous channel is a simple resource
that captures (a form of) receiver anonymity. We note that Pfitzmann and Waidner [PW85]
gave an early treatment of several flavors of anonymity across networks, including receiver
anonymity. They explicitly considered the idea of using public-key encryption schemes in the
realization of receiver-anonymous networks. However, we note that our treatment in this paper
gives a more thorough assessment of the notion of anonymity and additionally investigates the
properties that are sufficient and necessary to achieve different levels of receiver anonymity.
Nagao et al. [NMO08] describe a similar resource for two sender-anonymous channels and show
that such channels can be related by reductions to other types of channels, such as secure chan-
nels and direction hiding channels. Ishai et al. [IKOS06] provide a broader investigation on how
to bootstrap cryptographic functionalities using anonymity. However, it should be noted that
the kind of anonymous channels we construct here cannot be used for their purposes. In partic-
ular, Ishai et al. assume the existence of a particular type of sender-anonymous channel which
is somewhat compatible with the notion of sender-anonymity in the framework of Hevia and
Micciancio [HM08] (however, whereas the distinguishing adversary in [HM08] chooses the mul-
tiset of messages delivered by the senders in the game instantiation, the adversary in [IKOS06]
is simply given this set, but has no control over it). By contrast, the resource we construct here
provides receiver anonymity, rather than sender anonymity, and we also include confidentiality
as a crucial property of our final resource (Ishai et al., however, assume that the adversary is
aware of the messages sent in clear by various anonymous senders).
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2 Preliminaries
Notation. We use the symbol ♦ to denote an “error” output of an algorithm. Moreover, for
an integer n ∈ N, we let [n] := {1, . . . , n}. We generally use typewriter fonts such as enc or dec
to denote algorithms.
2.1 Systems: Resources and Converters, Distinguishers, and Games
We model objects like resources and protocols in terms of systems. At the highest level of
abstraction—following the hierarchy in [MR11]—systems are objects with interfaces by which
they connect to (interfaces of) other systems. Each interface is labeled with an element of
a given label set. Multiple interfaces can be merged into a single interface; we then call the
original interfaces the sub-interfaces of the combined interface.
This concept of abstract systems captures the topological structures that result when several
systems are connected via their interfaces. In the following, we describe the basic types of
systems that appear in this work at this level (of abstraction), and we introduce a notation for
describing the structure in which multiple such systems are composed.
The abstract systems concept however does not model the behavior of systems, i.e., how
the systems interact via their interfaces. As statements about cryptographic protocols are
statements about behavior, they are formalized at the next (lower) abstraction level. In this
respect, all systems in this work are (probabilistic) discrete systems, similar to [Mau02].
Resources and converters. A resource for a multi-party setting is a system that provides
one interface for each party. In our setting, resources have one interface labeled A for the sender,
n interfaces labeled B1, . . . , Bn for the n receivers, and one interface labeled E associated with
the attacker. Resources are usually denoted either by special symbols such as / or by bold-face
upper-case letters like R or S. Protocols are formalized as tuples of so-called converters, one for
each honest party; converters are systems that have two interfaces: one inside and one outside
interface. Standard notations for converters are small Greek letters or special identifiers such
as enc or dec; the set of all converters is denoted as Σ. A complete protocol (i.e., a tuple of
converters) is denoted by a bold-face Greek letter, such as pi.
Converters can be attached to resources by connecting the inside interface of the converter
to one interface of the resource. Notationally, if we attach the inside interface of the converter
φ ∈ Σ to interface I of the resource R, we write φIR. The resulting system φIR is again a
resource which provides all the interfaces of R (apart from I) as the respective interfaces, and
the outside interface of the converter as the I-interface. This operation extends to the case
where the interface I is obtained by merging several sub-interfaces. If all (honest) parties use a
protocol pi, then all converters that together form pi, one for each (honest) party, are attached
to the respective interfaces of the resource. This is then denoted as piR.
Multiple resources R1, . . . ,Rm with the same label set I can be composed in parallel. This
is denoted [R1, . . . ,Rm] and is again a resource, such that each interface I ∈ I of [R1, . . . ,Rm]
allows to access the corresponding interfaces of R1, . . . , Rm.
Distinguishers. A distinguisher D is a special type of system that connects to all interfaces
of a resource U and outputs a single bit at the end of its interaction with U. We write this as
the expression DU, which defines a binary random variable. The distinguishing advantage of a
distinguisher D on two systems U and V is defined as
∆D(U,V) := |P(DU = 1)− P(DV = 1)|,
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and we define ∆D(U,V) := supD∈D∆D(U,V) as the advantage of a class D of distinguishers.
The distinguishing advantage measures how much the output distribution of D differs when it
is connected to either U or V. Intuitively, if no distinguisher differentiates between U and V,
they can be used interchangeably in any environment (otherwise the environment can serve as
a distinguisher).
The distinguishing advantage is a pseudo-metric. In particular, it satisfies the triangle
inequality, i.e., ∆D(U,W) ≤ ∆D(U,V) + ∆D(V,W) for all resources U, V, and W, and for
all distinguishers D. Two systems are equivalent, denoted by U ≡ V, if they have the same
behavior, which is the same as requiring that ∆D(U,V) = 0 for all distinguishers D.
The notion of construction. The formalization of constructive security definitions follows
the ideal-world/real-world paradigm. The “real world” corresponds to an execution of the
protocol pi in which all honest parties have their converter attached to the assumed resource R;
more formally, we consider the real-world system piR. The “ideal world” corresponds to the
constructed resource S with a simulator σ connected to the E-interface of S, written σES
and referred to as ideal-world system. The purpose of σ is to adapt the E-interface of S such
that it resembles the corresponding interface of piR.3 If the two systems piR and σES are
indistinguishable, then this roughly means that “whatever an attacker can do in the real world,
he can also do in the ideal world”.
Apart from the security condition described above, we also require an availability condition,4
which excludes trivial protocols: If no attacker is present, the protocol must implement the
specified functionality. In the definition, we use the special converter “⊥” that, when attached
to a certain interface of a system, blocks this interface for the distinguisher.5
Definition 2.1 (Construction). The protocol pi constructs S from the resource R within ε and
with respect to the class D of distinguishers if
∃σ ∈ Σ : ∆D(piR, σES) ≤ ε and ∆D(⊥EpiR,⊥ES) ≤ ε.
An important property of Definition 2.1 is its composability. Intuitively, if a resource S is
used in the construction of a larger system, then the composability implies that S can be replaced
by a construction piR without requiring an explicit security reduction. For completeness, we
include the composition theorem (which is adapted from [MT10]) in Section A of the appendix.
(Static) corruption of parties. In our setting with multiple receivers, we are interested in
statements about settings in which one or more of the receivers are corrupted by the adversary.
Here, corruption refers to a setting in which the adversary has full control over the (computer
of the) receiver, e.g. by infecting the computer with malware. A resource R in this setting is
(formally) a family of systems RC parametrized by a subset C ⊆ [n], where i ∈ C means that Bi
is considered corrupted, and the system RC will (usually) provide the capabilities corresponding
to the interfaces Bi with i ∈ C at the E-interface.6 Constructing a resource S from a resource
R with respect to static corruption then means that the condition must hold with respect to
each set C ⊆ [n], more formally, for each C ⊆ [n],
∃σ ∈ Σ : ∆D(piRC , σESC) ≤ ε
3Indeed, the adversary can emulate the behavior of any efficient simulator σ; thus, using σES instead of S
can only restrict the adversary’s power, so using σES and hence piR instead of S is safe.
4This corresponds to the completeness or correctness properties in some contexts.
5The ⊥-converter also signals to the resource that no attacker is present.
6The exact behavior upon corruption depends on the particular resource. In particular, all resources in this
work forward all inputs and outputs at interfaces Bi with i ∈ C to/from the E-interface, further modifications of
their behavior are described explicitly.
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must hold in addition to the availability condition in Definition 2.1. The protocol pi is then said
to construct S from R with respect to static corruptions if the above conditions are fulfilled for
all C ⊆ [n].
Public-key encryption schemes. A public-key encryption (PKE) scheme with message
spaceM, ciphertext space C, and public-key space PK is typically described as three algorithms
PKE = (kgen, enc, dec). The key-generation algorithm kgen outputs a key pair (pk, sk), the
(probabilistic) encryption algorithm enc takes a message m ∈ M and a public key pk and
outputs a ciphertext c = enc(pk;m), and the decryption algorithm takes a ciphertext c ∈ C and
a secret key sk and outputs a plaintext m = dec(sk; c). It is possible that the output of the
decryption algorithm is the special symbol ♦; this indicates that the ciphertext c is invalid.
In constructive cryptography, using PKE in a setting with only one sender and one receiver
can be described as deploying converters enc1 (associated with the sender) and dec1 (associated
with the receiver) as follows. The receiver (within dec1) initially runs the key-generation algo-
rithm kgen to obtain a key pair (sk, pk), stores the private key sk locally, and sends the public
key pk via an authenticated channel (denoted ←−•, the first assumed resource). Upon receiving
a ciphertext c˜ at the inside interface (via an a priori insecure communication channel −→, the
second assumed resource), dec1 computes m˜ = dec(sk; c˜) and outputs m˜. The encryption con-
verter enc1 initially obtains the public key pk (via ←−•) and, for each message m obtained at
the outside interface, enc1 computes c = enc(pk;m) and sends c over the insecure channel −→.
As pointed out already in [MS96], this constructs a confidential channel −→•.
In this paper, we consider PKE schemes deployed in a setting with one sender A and n
receivers B1, . . . , Bn, corresponding to a tuple (enc, dec, . . . , dec) of n + 1 converters. Each
converter dec is defined similarly to dec1 above, but if the decryption algorithm dec outputs an
error ♦, then the converter dec outputs nothing. The encryption converter enc connects at its
inside interface to n + 1 resources. By using the first n resources (which will be instantiated
by ←−•n, denoting that for each receiver Bi there is one authenticated channel from Bi to A),
enc expects to obtain public keys pk1, . . . , pkn. Upon receiving (m, i) ∈ M× [n] at the outside
interface, enc computes c = enc(pki;m) and sends (c, i) via the (n+ 1)st resource (instantiated
by an insecure broadcast network / ) at the inside interface.
Games and security properties. Game-based definitions specify a property of a cryp-
tographic scheme based on an interaction between two (hypothetical) entities: the game (or
challenger) and the adversary. During the interaction, the adversary may issue “oracle queries”
to the challenger, the responses of which model what information may be leaked to the adver-
sary. The adversary’s goal is specified by the game, and could be, e.g., forging a message or
distinguishing encryptions of different messages. If this game cannot be won by any (efficient)
adversary, then the scheme is secure against the considered type of attack.
We formalize the adversary and the game as systems that are connected by their interfaces.
The game, often denoted as G with additional super- and subscripts, allows the adversary A
to issue “oracle queries” via that interface. Whether or not the game is won is signaled by a
special (monotone) output bit of G (this can be considered as an additional interface) that is
initially 0 but switches to 1 as soon as the winning condition is fulfilled. This bit is denoted
Output. For a game G and an adversary A, we define the game-winning probability after q steps
(queries) as
ΓAq (G) := P
AG(Outputq = 1).
For an adversary A that halts after (at most) q steps, we write ΓA(G) := ΓAq (G).
Many games considered in the context of encryption schemes, including most games consid-
ered here, are bit-guessing games. These games can often be described by a pair of systems G0
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and G1, with the interpretation that in the beginning of the game, a bit B ∈ {0, 1} is chosen
uniformly at random. The adversary will then be given access to GB, and the goal is to guess
the bit B. The adversary can win such a game with probability 12 trivially by simply guessing
the hidden bit. Hence, we measure the adversary’s success in terms of his advantage, that is, the
(absolute) difference between A’s probability of winning G and the success probability for these
“trivial” strategies, formally ΦA(G) = 2 · ∣∣ΓA(G)− 12 ∣∣. Note also that ΦA(G) = ∆A(G0,G1).
For a security property that is defined by means of G, we say that the scheme is secure
within ε and with respect to a class A of adversaries if the advantage A ∈ A has in winning G
is bounded by ε.
Asymptotics. To allow for asymptotic security definitions, cryptographic protocols are often
equipped with a so-called security parameter. We formulate all statements in this paper in a
non-asymptotic fashion, but asymptotic statements can be obtained by treating systems S as
asymptotic families {Sk}k∈N and letting the distinguishing advantage be a real-valued function
of k. Then, for a given notion of efficiency, one can consider security with respect to classes
of efficient distinguishers and a suitable negligibility notion. All reductions in this work are
efficient with respect to the standard polynomial-time notions.
2.2 Games for Confidentiality, Key Privacy, and Robustness
We describe the queries that an adversary can ask in a game formally as procedures that he can
call ; the specific game structure is enforced by the order in which they are called. This is not
a technically new approach (see for instance [BR06]); however, it integrates smoothly with the
security statements we aim for in this work. The most important properties for our work are
IND-CCA-security, key privacy, and robustness.
Confidentiality. The most common security property required of PKE schemes is indis-
tinguishability under chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). Usually, IND-CCA is defined as
a left-or-right (LoR) indistinguishability game, where an adversary must guess which of two
messages of his choice are encrypted under a known public key. Here, we generally use the
real-or-random (RoR) version of IND-CCA; the difference is that the RoR challenger encrypts
either an adversarially-chosen message m0 or a randomly chosen m1 (of the same length as m0),
depending on a hidden bit B. The RoR game formalizes a slightly relaxed condition; there is a
(simple) reduction that loses a factor of 2. We describe this game in Figure 1.
Init() Decrypt(c) GenChallenge(m) GameOutput(d)
(sk, pk)← kgen()
Chal ← ∅ //chal. ctext
Output← 0 //Output bit
return pk
end.
if c = Chal
return ♦
end if.
m← dec(sk, c)
return m
end.
if Chal 6= ∅
return ♦
Chal← enc(pkB,m)
return Chal
end.
if Chal = ∅
return ♦
else
Output← (d = B)
end.
Figure 1: The IND-CCA game for input B, Gind-cca.
Definition 2.2 (IND-CCA security). A public-key encryption scheme PKE = (kgen, enc, dec)
is ε-IND-CCA-secure with respect to a class D of adversaries if for every A ∈ D it holds that
ΦA(Gind-cca) = 2 ·
∣∣∣∣ΓA(Gind-cca)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
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We can also use replayability in IND-CCA security, as described in [CKN03]. In the IND-
RCCA game, replays of the challenge ciphertext won’t be decrypted (an error message will be
output by the decryption algorithm). In particular, c∗ is a replay of the challenge ciphertext c
if: (1) c∗ is input to the decryption oracle after c is generated; and (2) equiv(c∗, c) = 1 for an
equivalence relation equiv. In IND-RCCA security, we set equiv(c∗, c) = 1 iff. c∗ decrypts to
either of the challenge plaintexts m0,m1. The game is described in detail in Figure 2, and the
security definition is analogous to Definition 2.2.
Init() Decrypt(c) GenChallenge(m) GameOutput(d)
(sk, pk)← kgen()
Chal ← ∅
Output← 0
return pk
end.
if (dec(sk, c) = dec(sk,Chal))
return ♦
end if.
m← dec(sk, c)
return m
end.
if Chal 6= ∅∨ (c = Chal)
return ♦
else
cB ← enc(pkB,m)
Chal ← cB
return cB
end.
if Chal = ∅
return ♦
else
Output← (d = B)
end.
Figure 2: The IND-RCCA game for input B, Gind-rcca.
Key privacy. In a key-private PKE scheme, the adversary, given two public keys pk0 and
pk1, must be unable to tell which key was used to generate a given ciphertext [BBDP01]. This
definition is similar in spirit to the standard “left-or-right” IND-CCA definition, where the
adversary is given the public key, but does not know which of two messages is encrypted under
it. In the key-privacy game the message is known, but not the public key. The notion can be
formalized as a bit-guessing game GB (for a hidden bit B), which we show in Figure 3.
In particular, we denote by Chal the challenge ciphertext and by Output, the output bit.
The decryption procedure Decrypt(·, ·) takes as input a ciphertext c and a bit bit, the latter
indicating under which secret key A wishes to decrypt c. If the adversary asks to decrypt
the challenge ciphertext after the challenge has been generated, the algorithm returns ♦; else,
it returns the decryption of the ciphertext c under skbit. The challenge generation algorithm
GenChallenge can be run only exactly once during the game; if the adversary runs this
procedure for a second time, the algorithm outputs ♦. The challenge ciphertext is then output
to the adversary.
Init() Decrypt(c, bit) GenChallenge(m) GameOutput(d)
(sk0, pk0)← kgen()
(sk1, pk1)← kgen()
Chal ← ∅
Output← 0
return pk0, pk1
end.
if c = Chal
return ♦
end if.
m← dec(skbit, c)
return m
end.
if Chal 6= ∅
return ♦
else
cB ← enc(pkB,m)
Chal ← cB
return cB
end.
if Chal = ∅
return ♦
else
Output← (d = B)
end.
Figure 3: The IK-CCA game for input B, Gik-ccaB .
Definition 2.3 (IK-CCA security). A public-key encryption scheme PKE = (kgen, enc, dec)
is ε-IK-CCA-secure with respect to a class D of adversaries if for every A ∈ D it holds that
ΦA(Gik-cca) = 2 ·
∣∣∣∣ΓA(Gik-cca)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
We use two further variants of key privacy. The first is replayable IK-CCA (or IK-RCCA)
security, which is a weakened version of IK-CCA security in the same spirit in which IND-RCCA
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is a weakened version of IND-CCA. The complete description of the IK-RCCA game is depicted
in Figure 4.
Init() Decrypt(c, bit) GenChallenge(m) GameOutput(d)
(sk0, pk0)← kgen()
(sk1, pk1)← kgen()
Chal ← ∅ //chal. ctext
Output← 0 //Output bit
return pk0, pk1
end.
if (c = Chal) ∨ (dec(skB,Chal)
∈ {dec(sk0, c), dec(sk1, c)})
return ♦
end if.
m← dec(skbit, c)
return m
end.
if Chal 6= ∅
return ♦
else
cB ← enc(pkB,m)
Chal ← cB
return cB
end.
if Chal = ∅
return ♦
else
Output← (d = B)
end.
Figure 4: The IK-RCCA game for input B, Gik-rccaB .
The second notion we consider is 1-sided-replayable-CCA security, where the decryption
oracle is modified so that it only decrypts under the first of the generated secret keys. The game
is depicted in Figure 5. The security definitions in both cases is analogous to Definition 2.3,
but with respect to the modified games. We relate the notions of 1-sided and standard IK-CCA
Init() Decrypt(c) GenChallenge(m) GameOutput(d)
(sk0, pk0)← kgen()
(sk1, pk1)← kgen()
Chal ← ∅
Output← 0
return pk0, pk1
end.
if c = Chal
return ♦
end if.
m← dec(sk0, c)
return m
end.
if Chal 6= ∅
return ♦
else
cB ← enc(pkB,m)
Chal ← cB
return cB
end.
if Chal = ∅
return ⊥
else
Output← (d = B)
end.
Figure 5: The IK-1-sided-CCA game for input B, G1-sided-ik-ccaB .
security in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2.4. Let PKE = (kgen, enc, dec) be a public-key encryption scheme, and assume that
the two invocations of kgen in Gik-cca use independent randomness. The following two state-
ments hold:
1. There is a reduction R(·) such that for every 1-sided-IK-CCA adversary A,
ΦA(G1-sided-ik-cca) ≤ ΦR(A)(Gik-cca).
2. There is a reduction R′(·) such that for every IK-CCA adversary A,
ΦA(Gik-cca) ≤ 2 · ΦR′(A)(G1-sided-ik-cca).
Proof sketch. The first statement follows immediately, as the reduction can emulate G1-sided-ik-cca
perfectly. For the second statement, the reduction must simulate A’s queries to the decryption
oracle. There are two crucial points here. First, the reduction will hand A the public key pk0
received from G1-sided-ik-cca (denoted pk), and one generated by R′(A) itself, denoted pk∗, for
which it knows the private key. However, note that the order in which the adversary receives
the keys is important, as G1-sided-ik-cca always decrypts ciphertexts using the “first” private
key: thus, the reduction first flips an independently chosen bit b; the order in which it hands
the public keys to A depends on this bit. The reduction answers decryption queries either
by using sk∗ or by using G1-sided-ik-cca (depending on b and the bit in the decryption query).
Finally, when A outputs some guess d, R′(·) guesses d⊕ b. For the analysis, note that if R′(A)
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interacts with G1-sided-ik-cca0 , then the simulation of G
ik-cca is perfect. Otherwise, the adversary’s
guess is statistically independent of (and hence completely randomized by) b. The total success
probability is PR
′(A)G1-sided-ik-cca(Output = 1) = 12pA +
1
4 . The overall advantage of the reduction
is 2PR
′(A)G1-sided-ik-cca(Output = 1)− 1 = PAGik-cca(Output = 1)− 12 = Φ
A(Gik-cca)
2 .
Robustness. The notion of robustness in encryption was formalized by Abdalla et al. [ABN10]
in two flavors: weak and strong robustness. They consider both versions under both chosen
plaintext and chosen ciphertext attacks. We focus here on weak, resp. strong robustness under
chosen ciphertext attacks (WROB-CCA, resp. SROB-CCA), associated with the experiments
in Figures 6, resp. 7, where the adversary may call the following oracles.
• On input an identifier ID, the oracle GenUser(·) generates a public and a private key for
the user ID and returns the public key. A set U keeps track of the users generated by the
GenUser(·) oracle, i.e. the honestly generated key pairs.
• On input a valid identifier ID ∈ U , the oracle Corrupt(·) returns the private key corre-
sponding to user ID and adds the identifier to a set V .
• On input a valid identifier ID ∈ U and a ciphertext c, the decryption oracle Decrypt(·, ·)
outputs the corresponding plaintext m.
Init() GenUser(ID) Corrupt(ID) Decrypt(ID, c) GameOutput(m, ID0, ID1)
U ← ∅
V ← ∅
Output← 0
end.
(skID, pkID)← kgen()
U ← U ∪{(ID; skID; pkID)}
return pkID
end.
if (ID; ·; ·) 6∈ U
return ♦
end if.
V ← V ∪ {ID}
return skID from U
end.
if (ID; ·; ·) 6∈ U
return ♦
end if.
return dec(skID, c)
end.
if (ID0 = ID1)∨{ID0, ID1}∩V 6= ∅
return ♦
end if. c← enc(pkID0 ,m)
m1 ← dec(skID1 , c)
Output← (m 6= ♦) ∧ (m1 6= ♦)
end.
Figure 6: The weak robustness game, Gw-rob.
In the WROB-CCA game, the adversary chooses a plaintext and two identities. The plain-
text is encrypted by the challenger (without tampering) for the first identity. The adversary
wins if this ciphertext decrypts to a valid plaintext for the second identity. By contrast, for
strong robustness (SROB-CCA), the adversary can manipulate ciphertexts and wins if a chosen
ciphertext decrypts to valid plaintexts for two different public keys.
Init() GenUser(ID) Corrupt(ID) Decrypt(ID, c) GameOutput(c, ID0, ID1)
U ← ∅
V ← ∅
Output← 0
end.
(skID, pkID)← kgen()
U ← U ∪{(ID; skID; pkID)}
return pkID
end.
if (ID; ·; ·) 6∈ U
return ♦
end if.
V ← V ∪ {ID}
return skID from U
end.
if (ID; ·; ·) 6∈ U
return ♦
end if.
return dec(skID, c)
end.
if (ID0 = ID1)∨{ID0, ID1}∩V 6= ∅
return ♦
end if.
Output← (dec(skID0 , c) 6= ♦)∧
(dec(skID1 , c) 6= ♦)
end.
Figure 7: The strong robustness game, Gs-rob.
3 Receiver-Anonymous Communication
The main goal of this work is to model and achieve confidential and receiver-anonymous com-
munication. We first formalize a useful anonymity guarantee by describing in Section 3.1 the
resource − ? / ••, which can actually be constructed from a “broadcast” channel and several au-
thenticated channels (to transmit the public keys). We then discuss in Section 3.2 in which
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(inefficient) way this construction can be achieved by vanilla public-key encryption, and, in Sec-
tion 3.3, we argue that “much more” anonymity is impossible to achieve. Finally, in Section 3.4
we show how to achieve this construction more efficiently, by means of a public-key encryption
scheme with the properties IND-CCA, IK-CCA [BBDP01], and WROB-CCA [ABN10].
3.1 Resources for Receiver-Anonymous Communication
An n-receiver channel is a resource with an interface labeled A for the sender, interfaces labeled
B1, . . . , Bn for the receivers, and a third type of interface labeled E that captures potential
adversarial access. The security properties of different n-receiver channels are described in the
following; the symbolic notation for the channels extends that from [MS96].
The security statements in this work are parametrized by the number of messages that are
transmitted over the channels. More precisely, for each of the following channels and each
q ∈ N, we define the q-bounded channel as the one that processes (only) the first q queries at
the A-interface and the first q queries at the E-interface as described, and ignores all further
queries at these interfaces. We then require from a protocol that it constructs, for all q ∈ N,
the q-bounded “ideal” channel from the q-bounded assumed channel.7 Wherever the number q
is significant, such as in the theorem statements, we denote the q-bounded versions of channels
by writing the q on top of the channel symbol (e.g.,
q/ ); we omit it in places that are of less
formal nature.
Insecure broadcast communication. We base our constructions on a resource / , which
allows the sender to broadcast a given message to all receivers B1, . . . , Bn. Such a channel can
be implemented, for example, by multi-sending the same message individually to each receiver
over an insecure network; the channel models also what is achieved by wireless broadcast. The
resource / leaks the complete message at the E-interface, and allows to delete, change, or inject
messages destined for particular receivers via the E-interface. In more detail:
• If at the E-interface the ⊥-converter is connected,8 then on input the k-th message mk at
the A-interface, output mk at Bj for all j ∈ [n].
• Otherwise, on input the k-th message mk at the A-interface, output mk at the E-interface.
Upon the query (inject, j, m˜) at the E-interface for j ∈ [n] and m˜ ∈ M, deliver m˜ at
interface Bj .
The behavior of / is depicted in Figure 8. On an input a message m at the A-interface, this
message is leaked at the E-interface. In contrast, the E-interface allows a potential attacker to
target messages to the individual recipients, such as message m to receiver i or message m˜ to
receiver i′ in the figure. In case no adversary is present (this is not depicted), messages input
at the A-interface are immediately delivered at all receivers’ interfaces.
Confidential receiver-anonymous communication. The confidential receiver-anonymous
channel − ? / •• leaks neither the message contents nor the intended recipient to the adversary,
just the message length. It allows, however, to “conditionally” deliver a message to a chosen
user if and only if this chosen user was the originally intended recipient.
• If at the E-interface the ⊥-converter is connected, then on the k-th input (mk, ik) at the
A-interface, output mk at Bik .
7This condition is equivalent to considering an “unbounded” channel; the important feature is that the protocol
is independent of the number q of messages.
8Formally, there is a special input that provokes this behavior, and the converter ⊥ provides this input.
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Figure 8: The insecure broadcast channel.
• Otherwise, on the k-th input (mk, ik) at the A-interface, output the message length |mk|
at the E-interface. (If ik ∈ C, then output (mk, ik) at the E-interface.) Furthermore, the
E-interface allows the following queries:
– (inject, j, m˜) for j ∈ [n] and m˜ ∈M: delivers m˜ at interface Bj ;
– (deliver, j, k¯) for j ∈ [n], k¯ ∈ N: If at least k¯ messages have been sent via A and
ik¯ = j, then it delivers the message mk¯ at Bj .
This is also depicted in Figure 9. In the application of a public-key cryptosystem to a broadcast
network such as − ? / ••, the capabilities at the E-interface correspond to trial deliveries of
intercepted messages and to adversarial encryptions.
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Figure 9: The confidential receiver-anonymous channel.
Authenticated channel. Each receiver uses one authenticated channel←−• to send its public
key to the sender; we use n parallel authenticated channels, denoted←−•n (one for each receiver),
as assumed resources in our constructions. Formally, a single authenticated channel ←−• with
message spaceM is a three-party resource with interfaces A, Bi (for some i), and E. On input
a message m ∈ M at interface Bi, the channel outputs m at the E-interface. The channel
outputs m at the A-interface only upon receiving an acknowledgement from the E-interface
(the adversary controls message delivery). If the sender Bi is corrupted, the message can be
injected via the E-interface.
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3.2 Generic Construction using Public-Key Encryption
The channel − ? / •• can be constructed from / and ←−•n using any secure public-key scheme:
Each receiver generates a key pair and sends the public key through its authenticated channel
←−• to the sender; the sender transmits a message to a specific receiver by concatenating
(in a fixed predetermined order): an encryption of this message under the intended receiver’s
public key and a “garbage” message encrypted with the appropriate key for each additional
potential receiver; this composite message is then sent via the broadcast channel. Each receiver
decrypts only “its” part of the composite ciphertext and checks whether or not the message was
“garbage.” (A simple way to implement the above “garbage” message is to set it to a public
constant message m¯ ∈ M which is used only for that purpose.) If the broadcast channel is
achieved by multi-sending the same message to each receiver, then one can also send only the
corresponding part to each receiver.
Yet, this approach has two main disadvantages. First, the computation and communication
complexity is linear in the (potentially large) number of possible receivers. Second, the sender
must know the public keys of all potential receivers, not just of the one intended receiver.
3.3 “Upper Bounds” on Anonymity
Informally speaking, anonymity beyond the guarantees formalized by − ? / •• is unlikely to be
achieved from the resources / and←−•n which we assumed. Indeed, we show that a (minor and
natural) extension of − ? / •• cannot be achieved from our assumed resources. The extension,
denoted by ANON, removes the “conditional delivery” capability provided at the E-interface
in resource − ? / ••, and enables deliveries of the type (deliver, k¯) for k¯ ∈ N, where, if at least
k¯ messages have been sent via A, then the message mk¯ is delivered to Bik¯ . In particular, the
distinguisher can use the E-interface of system / to deliver the messages to, e.g., only one
chosen receiver, which will output the message if and only if it is the intended recipient. We
call this process a “trial delivery” and show that it allows the distinguisher to tell the real-world
system apart from the ideal-world system with ANON, where trial deliveries are impossible by
definition.
This result is formalized in Theorem 3.1, and we give a proof sketch below. Note that
the channel ANON is just one type of ideal resource providing stronger anonymity guarantees
than − ? / ••; however, our impossibility result extends easily to any resource without conditional
deliveries.
In the proof, we construct a distinguisher D2 that exploits this difference in that inputs
at the A-interface a message m for some receiver Bj with j ∈ [n] uniformly at random. Once
the ciphertext sent via / is received at the E-interface, D2 forwards this message (each with
probability 12) either to the intended receiver Bj , or to some other receiver Bj′ , with j
′ 6= j.
While in the protocol, m is delivered iff the message was delivered to Bj (known to D2), the
simulator is oblivious of j and will choose the wrong action—whether or not to use deliver—
with probability at least 12 .
Theorem 3.1. Let (piA, piB, . . . , piB) be any protocol supposed to construct ANON from / and
←−•n. There are distinguishers D1 and D2 such that, for any simulator σ,
εav := ∆
D1(piAApi
B1
B . . . pi
Bn
B ⊥E [←−•n, / ],⊥E(ANON))
and
εsec := ∆
D2(piAApi
B1
B . . . pi
Bn
B [←−•n, / ], σE(ANON))
such that εav + εsec ≥ 12 .
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Proof sketch. Assume that there exist a protocol (piA, piB, . . . , piB) and a simulator σ such that
the transformation holds. The distinguishers D1 and D2 described in the following start by
taking some fixed message m ∈ M and sending it to the receiver Bj with j ∈ [n] chosen
uniformly at random.
If the output at the Bj-interfaces is as expected—i.e., Bj outputs m, all Bi with i 6= j remain
silent—the distinguisher D1 outputs 0, otherwise it outputs 1. The distinguisher D2 begins
similarly to D1 but obtains the message c that is broadcast by the sender at the adversarial
interface of / . Then, D2 chooses some j′ 6= j and uses the E-interface of / to forward the
transmitted message either only to Bj or only to Bj′ , each with probability
1
2 . Then,
• D2 delivers to Bj : if D2 obtains the output m at Bj (and no output elsewhere), output
0, otherwise output 1;
• D2 delivers to Bj′ : if D2 obtains any output at any receiver’s interface, output 1, otherwise
output 0.
By definition of ANON and D1, P
(
D1⊥E(ANON) = 0
)
= 1. Note that, when connected to
the real-world system, the distinguisher D2 outputs 0 with at least the same probability as D1:
If D2 outputs 1, then either D2 delivers to Bj and Bj does not output m although it received
the message, so D1 would also output 1; or D2 delivers to Bj′ and Bj′ provides output, in which
case D1 also outputs 1. Formally,
P
(
D2pi
A
Api
B1
B . . . pi
Bn
B [ / ,←−•n] = 0) ≥ P(D1piAApiB1B . . . piBnB ⊥E [ / ,←−•n] = 0) .
Furthermore, P
(
D2σ
E(ANON) = 0
) ≤ 12 . To see this, note that, when the distinguisher forwards
the message, the simulator has a choice of whether to deliver the message (by using the deliver-
command) or not. This choice is independent of whether or not D2 forwards the message to
either Bj or to Bj′ (the simulator is oblivious to the distinguisher’s choice of j), so the decision
of the simulator is correct with probability at most 12 . This concludes the proof.
3.4 Achieving Confidential Receiver-Anonymous Communication
A public-key encryption scheme constructs the resource − ? / •• from a broadcast channel if it
has the properties IND-CCA, IK-CCA, and WROB-CCA. The property WROB-CCA (weak
robustness) captures the guarantee that ciphertexts honestly generated for one user will not
be successfully decrypted by another user. We show that weak robustness is sufficient for our
construction; in view of the discussion in [ABN10], this may be surprising, since the adversary
can inject arbitrary ciphertexts into the channel / . The intuitive reason why WROB-CCA is
sufficient is two-fold: First, preventing the adversary from generating a single “fresh” ciphertext
that is accepted by two receivers is only helpful if, for some reason, injecting two different
ciphertexts is impossible, or harder for the adversary than injecting a single one (cf. Section 4.3).
Second, the non-malleability guarantees of IND-CCA exclude that the adversary can “maul”
honestly generated ciphertexts such that unintended receivers decrypt “related” plaintexts (this
is used in the reduction to IND-CCA in the proof of Theorem 3.2).
The security statement we prove below is depicted in Figure 10, where we show how the
scheme is used together with the assumed resources: Each sender transmits its public key
authentically to the sender, who then uses the broadcast channel to transmit the ciphertext
to both receivers. Figure 10b shows the idealized setting, where the message is transmitted
via the resource − ? / •• (which guarantees confidentiality). The value “∗” is determined by the
simulator and depends on the values c˜1 and c˜2 given by the adversary; the symbol may stand
for a query to deliver the message m or to inject unrelated messages.
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Figure 10: The security statement in a setting with two receivers.
Theorem 3.2 shows that if the public-key encryption scheme has the three assumed prop-
erties, then the two settings in Figure 10 are indistinguishable. The intuitive interpretation of
this statement is that whenever such a scheme is used to protect messages transmitted via a
broadcast channel such as / , one obtains the guarantees explicitly described by the “idealized”
network resource − ? / ••. The proof of the theorem shows that every distinguisher for the two
settings can be transformed into an adversary against (at least) one of the three properties
IND-CCA, IK-CCA, and WROB-CCA with loss qn for q messages and n receivers.
Theorem 3.2. Let (kgen, enc, dec) be a public-key encryption scheme that has the three prop-
erties IND-CCA, IK-CCA, and WROB-CCA. Then, the protocol pke = (enc, dec, . . . , dec) ob-
tained from (kgen, enc, dec) as in Section 2.1 constructs − ? / •• from / and (←−•)n with respect
to static corruptions. More formally, for each C ⊆ [n], there are a simulator σ and for each
q ∈ N four reductions Aq(·), A′q(·), A′′q (·),A′′′q (·) such that
∆D
(
pke⊥E
[
q/ ,←−•n] ,⊥E q− ? / ••) ≤ qn · ΓAq(D) (Gw-rob) , (1)
and
∆D
(
pke
[
q/ C ,←−•nC] , σE q− ? / •• C)
≤ qn · ΦA′q(D)
(
Gind-cca
)
+ qn · ΦA′′q (D)
(
Gik-cca
)
+ qn · ΓA′′′q (D)
(
Gw-rob
)
. (2)
Proof sketch. We sketch the proofs for conditions (1) and (2) independently.
Availability. We describe a reduction Aq(·) that turns a distinguisher D between the real-
world system pke⊥E [ / ,←−•n] (which we denote R⊥) and the ideal-world system ⊥E(− ? / ••)
(denoted S⊥) into an adversary for the the WROB-CCA game. The idea of the proof is to
construct a monotone event sequence (MES, see [Mau02]), which becomes true once the distin-
guisher inputs a pair (m, i) at the A-interface such that a receiver Bj for some index C 63 j 6= i
outputs some plaintext mj 6= ♦. If the encryption scheme has perfect correctness, the systems
R⊥ and S⊥ are equivalent, conditioned on the MES remaining false (if the scheme is not per-
fectly correct, we alter the MES to take this into account). Yet, note that even isolating a query
(m, i) that invokes the MES does not immediately imply that a new encryption of the same m
and pki will yield another ciphertext (in the query of the WROB-CCA game) that decrypts to
m′j 6= ♦ by skj for the index j 6= i. Instead, for the reduction to be successful, the reduction
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Aq guesses the query and the receiver where this erroneous decryption will occur. Thus, the
reduction loses a factor qn, as claimed. (If C 6= ∅, the loss is smaller.)
Security. We first describe the simulator σ attached to the E-interface of the ideal resource.
The role of σ is to simulate the interaction at the E-interface to a distinguisher. We then
prove that σ is indeed a good simulator: in other words, we provide reductions that transform
a given successful distinguisher into a successful adversary against one of the following games:
IND-CCA, IK-1-sided-CCA, or WROB-CCA. The simulator σ runs as follows:
• Generate n−|C| private-/public-key pairs (pki, ski) with i ∈ [n]\C to simulate each pki that
it is transmitted via the corresponding channel ←−•. Furthermore, generate one auxiliary
key pair (p˜k, s˜k). For all j ∈ C, obtain a public key p¯ki at the simulated E-interface of
←−•.
• Upon the k-th message length `k from − ? / ••, generate a new ciphertext ck = enc(p˜k; 0`k)
and simulate ck as a message on / . If the channel leaked a pair (mk, ik) (which means
ik ∈ C), encrypt mi using p¯kik and simulate that ciphertext instead.
• When D delivers a message c˜ to some user j ∈ [n] \ C:
– In case c˜ = ck¯ for some k¯ ∈ N, issue (deliver, j, k¯) to − ? / ••.
– In case c˜ is “fresh,” compute m˜j := dec(skj ; c˜), and, if m˜j 6= ♦, issue (inject, j, m˜j)
to − ? / ••.
Assume that there exists a distinguisher D that successfully distinguishes the real-world system
pke [ / C ,←−•nC ] from the ideal-world system σE− ? / •• C . Before we sketch the security reductions
to the underlying games, we remark that the simulation for corrupted receivers is always perfect
(the ciphertext is computed exactly as in the honest encryption, and the injected ciphertexts
are simply forwarded) and can hence be ignored in the following arguments.
WROB-CCA. As a first intermediate step, we introduce a hybrid resource H1. This resource
behaves like − ? / ••, except that it allows for the delivery of an arbitrary message to a party other
than the intended recipient: namely, instead of the query (deliver, j, k¯), we allow to deliver a
message m˜ to a user Bj for j 6= ik¯ (still mk¯ for j = ik¯) by means of (deliver, j, k¯, m˜). We use a
modified simulator σ1 that sends the decryption of the ciphertext simulated for message k¯ under
the key of user j. The systems σE1 H1 and σ
E− ? / •• are equivalent unless, for some query, there is
a user Bj , not the intended recipient of some ciphertext, that outputs a message upon receiving
the ciphertext. A distinguisher that provokes this situation (i.e., it causes some unintended
recipient to output a message from a ciphertext) can be used to win the WROB-CCA game.
The reduction A′′′q (·) obtains n generated keys from the WROB-CCA game, which correspond
to the users, and an additional key, used to simulate ciphertexts. As in the availability proof,
A′′′q has to guess on which query (m˜l, il) and with respect to which other index j the erroneous
decryption will occur, for sending the appropriate m˜l, il, and j as its challenge in the weak
robustness game. In order to properly simulate the eavesdropper to the environment, we use
a slightly tweaked version of weak robustness (equivalent to the original one) where we also
obtain the generated ciphertext when running the GameOutput oracle.
IND-CCA. We introduce a second hybrid H2 that behaves as H1 but additionally leaks the
receiver’s identity (no anonymity). The suitable simulator σ2 always encrypts the all-zero string
of appropriate length for the respective user, and decrypts as needed. Two things must be shown:
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first, that σE2 H2 is indistinguishable from the real-world system; and second, that σ
E
1 H1 and
σE2 H2 are indistinguishable. We start with the former one, where the reduction A
′
q(·) uses a
hybrid argument to employ a distinguisher for σE2 H2 and pke [ / ,←−•n] to win the IND-CCA
game. Technically, one defines a sequence of hybrid systems, where the i-th hybrid simulates
“ideal” encryptions for the first i− 1 receivers, uses the game to simulate for the i-th receiver,
and “real” encryptions for the remaining receivers. The reduction A′q(·) then chooses i ∈ [n]
uniformly at random. Overall, the first hybrid with no simulated encryptions is equivalent to
pke [ / ,←−•n], while the hybrid with only simulated encryptions is equivalent to the hybrid
σE2 H2. As the IND-CCA game offers only a single challenge query, another hybrid argument
must be employed to account for the number of encryptions; this adds a factor of q.
IK-CCA. The last step is to show a reduction A′′q (·) that turns a distinguisher between σE1 H1
and σE2 H2 corresponding, respectively, to the first and second hybrid introduced in the proof,
into an IK-CCA-adversary. Recall that H2 behaves just like H1 except that it does not grant
anonymity. The first step is to show a reduction to 1-sided-IK-CCA, then we use Lemma 2.4
to complete the reduction to IK-CCA. We again use a hybrid argument with qn “intermediate”
systems between σE1 H1 and σ
E
2 H2, similarly to the IND-CCA case, such that each intermediate
system embeds the challenge at a different position (as above). All other keys, encryptions,
or decryptions are either simulated as “real” or as “ideal,” depending on their position. The
system where only the queries are “real” is equivalent to σE2 H2, and the system where only p˜k
was used (all queries are “ideal”) is equivalent to σE1 H1.
4 Relation to Notions of Robustness
While the confidential receiver-anonymous channel can be achieved using an encryption scheme
that fulfills IND-CCA, IK-CCA, and WROB-CCA, anonymity without robustness is not suf-
ficient. This was already noted by Abdalla et al. [ABN10], who point out that if one receiver
obtains a ciphertext that was intended for a different receiver, the decryption should yield this
information—by producing an error symbol—instead of an arbitrary, but well-formed plaintext,
because this undetected, but unintended plaintext message might “upset” higher level protocols.
This “robustness,” however, is not guaranteed by IND-CCA or IK-CCA.
This section formalizes and proves statements related to robustness. In Section 4.1 we
describe the type of channel one obtains if the public-key scheme is only IND-CCA- and IK-
CCA-secure; this confirms the intuition given in [ABN10]. We then show in Section 4.2 that
WROB-CCA is indeed formally necessary to construct the channel − ? / ••: Every scheme that
achieves the constructive notion will also be weakly robust (aside from being at least IND-
RCCA and IK-RCCA-secure). Finally, in Section 4.3 we show that a strongly robust scheme
will also only construct the resource − ? / ••, albeit with a tighter reduction with respect to the
security properties. We also explain why a strongly robust scheme does not help to construct a
“qualitatively better” resource from the given ones.
4.1 Anonymity with Erroneous Transmission
The channel one obtains from applying an IND-CCA and IK-CCA-secure scheme to / and
←−•n is the resource − $ / •• which is parametrized by a family of distributions (P`Y1...Yn)`∈N
and differs from − ? / •• only in the cases where honestly generated messages are transmitted
to receivers other than the intended one (either during an honest transmission or because the
adversary forwards an honestly sent message to such a receiver). Without weak robustness, the
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unintended receiver will output a message according to the (scheme-specific) distribution. A
formal description of − $ / •• follows.
• If at the E-interface the ⊥-converter is connected, then for the k-th input (mk, ik) at the
A-interface, choose m′k,1, . . . ,m
′
k,n according to P
|mk|
Y1...Yn
, output mk at Bik and m
′
k,j at Bj
for j 6= ik (if m′k,j 6= ♦, else nothing).
• Otherwise, on the k-th input (mk, ik) at the A-interface, output only the message length
|mk| at the E-interface. (Again, if ik ∈ C then the channel leaks (mk, ik) at the E-
interface.) Furthermore, the E-interface allows the following queries:
– (inject, j, m˜) for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and m˜ ∈M: Delivers m˜ at Bj ,
– (deliver, j, k¯, m˜) for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, k¯ ∈ N, and m ∈M: If at least k¯ messages have
been sent via A, then delivers message mk¯ at Bj if ik¯ = j, and delivers m˜ at Bj
otherwise.
The behavior of the channel is also depicted in Figure 11. On input a message m and an
intended receiver i at the A-interface, the channel leaks only the message length |m| at the
E-interface (not the identity of the intended receiver). The E-interface allows the attacker to
“deliver” such a message to any receiver. If the correct receiver is chosen (here i), the output
is the correct message (here m), if a wrong receiver is chosen (here i′), the output is a different
message (here m′i′). Alternatively, the attacker can also inject messages to any receiver, in the
figure this corresponds to the message m˜ sent to receiver i′′.
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Figure 11: The receiver-anonymous channel with erroneous transmission, the value m′i′ is chosen
according to P
|mk|
Yi′
.
Theorem 4.1 below shows that the channel − $ / •• is constructed from / and n authenticated
channels ←−• if the encryption scheme is IND-CCA- and IK-CCA-secure. In the proof, we
instantiate the channel − $ / •• with a distribution P`Y1...Yn that we define by honestly choosing
keys for the receivers and, whenever a message is sent to a party Bi, decrypting a “random
ciphertext” of the correct length with respect to the keys of all parties Bj with j 6= i.
Theorem 4.1. An encryption scheme that is both IND-CCA- and 1-sided-IK-CCA-secure con-
structs − $ / •• from / and (←−•)n with respect to static corruptions. More formally, for each
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C ⊆ [n], there are a simulator σ and three reductions Aq(·), A′q(·), and A′′q (·) such that
∆D
(
pke⊥E
[
q/ ,←−•n] ,⊥E( q− $ / ••)) ≤ qn · ΦAq(D) (Gind-cca) , (3)
and
∆D
(
pke
[
q/ C ,←−•nC] , σE( q− $ / •• C))
≤ qn · ΦA′q(D)
(
Gind-cca
)
+ qn · ΦA′′q (D)
(
G1-sided-ik-cca
)
. (4)
Proof sketch. We first sketch the proof of the availability condition (3). This proof has a similar
structure as the one of Theorem 3.2. The first step is to define a distribution P`Y1...Yn for − $ / ••
as follows: initially choose (using the key generation algorithm) n public-/private-key pairs for
the users. For the intended recipient, the message is delivered unchanged; each other recipient
Bj obtains m
′
j := dec(skj ; c˜) for c˜ := enc(pki, 0
|m|), or no output if m′j = ♦. The reduction Aq(·)
then again uses a hybrid argument similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 3.2; intuitively,
each intermediate system embeds the challenge query of the IND-CCA-game at one particular
recipient and message (number).
Security. To show condition (4), we describe a simulator σ that emulates the adversary’s
interface of ←−• and / . This simulator behaves as follows:
• Generate n−|C| private-/public-key pairs (pki, ski) with i ∈ [n]\C to simulate each pki that
it is transmitted via the corresponding channel ←−•. Furthermore, generate one auxiliary
key pair (p˜k, s˜k). For all j ∈ C, obtain a public key p¯ki at the simulated E-interface of
←−•.
• Upon receiving the k-th message length `k at the E-interface of − $ / ••, generate a ci-
phertext ck = enc(p˜k; 0
`k) and simulate ck as a message on / . If the channel leaked a
pair (mk, ik) (which means ik ∈ C), encrypt mi using p¯kik and simulate that ciphertext
instead.
• When delivering a message c˜ to some user j ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
– In case c˜ = ck¯ for some k¯ ∈ N, compute m˜j := dec(skj ; c˜) and, if m˜j 6= ♦, issue
(deliver, j, k¯, m˜j) to − $ / ••.
– In case c˜ is “fresh,” compute m˜j := dec(skj ; c˜), and, if m˜j 6= ♦, issue (inject, j, m˜j)
to − $ / ••.
Now, we have to show that if (kgen, enc, dec) is a “good” encryption scheme, then applying
it to [ / C ,←−•nC ] results in a system that is indistinguishable from σE(− $ / •• C). This is proven
similar to Theorem 3.2, i.e., via reductions that win the IND-CCA or 1-sided-IK-CCA games,
respectively. The proof follows exactly the same structure as the corresponding parts of the one
for Theorem 3.2.
4.2 “Equivalence” with Weak Robustness
In Section 3.4 we showed that IND-CCA, IK-CCA, and WROB-CCA security are sufficient to
construct − ? / ••. Indeed, (slightly weaker variants of) these properties are also necessary : If a
PKE scheme is sufficient for the construction, then it must also be weakly robust, IND-RCCA,
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and IK-RCCA. Note that “CCA”-notions are sufficient, but not necessary, as they also prohibit
that a scheme allows for “trivial” modifications of the ciphertext, which do not have an impact
on the actual security [CKN03, MRT12].
The formal statement and the proof of Theorem 4.2 are given below. The basic idea is
that for each of the three games for weak robustness, IND-RCCA, and IK-RCCA, we show
that a successful adversary will also serve as a good distinguisher in the constructive security
statement.
Theorem 4.2. Let (enc, dec) be a public-key encryption scheme that transforms [←−•n, / ] into
− ? / ••, such that M = ⋃l∈L{0, 1}l with L ⊆ {l ∈ N | l ≥ `} for some ` ∈ N. Then there are a
reduction R1(·) such that for any q-query IND-RCCA-adversary A1 we have
ΦA1(Gind-rcca) ≤ 4∆R1(A1)
(
encAdecB1 . . . decBn
[
2q/ ,←−•n] , σE( 2q− ? / ••)
)
+ q2/2`−2, (5)
a reduction R2(·) such that for any q-query IK-RCCA-adversary A2 we have
ΦA2(Gik-rcca) ≤ 4∆R2(A2)
(
encAdecB1 . . . decBn
[
2q/ ,←−•n] , σE( 2q− ? / ••)
)
+ q2/2`−2, (6)
and a reduction R3(·) such that for any q-query WROB-CCA-adversary A3 we have
ΓA3(Gw-rob) ≤ N¯2 ·∆R3(A3)
(
encAdecB1 . . . decBn
[
2q/ ←−•n] , σE( 2q− ? / ••)
)
+ N¯2 · q2/2`, (7)
where A3 invokes at most N¯ users.
Proof sketch. The main idea of the proof is to show that any of the adversaries A1,A2,A3 can
be turned into a distinguisher for the constructive security statement, i.e, distinguishing the
real-world system from the ideal-world system. To prove this, we first construct a particular
simulator, which is “universal” in the sense that if there is any simulator such that the real-
world system and ideal-world system are indistinguishable, then this particular simulator will
be (nearly) as good. After describing the simulator and proving that it is universal, we describe
reductions Ri(·) such that for any adversary Ai (here i = 1, . . . , 3), it holds that Ri(Ai) is a
good distinguisher between the real resource and the universal simulator.
The simulator we describe is denoted σpk1 , since it always uses the key pk1 to encrypt. This
simulator behaves exactly as the one in Theorem 3.2, except: (1) upon receiving message length
l′, it encrypts 0l′−l||x with x ∈ {0, 1}l chosen uniformly at random; (2) on receiving a ciphertext,
the simulator decrypts with sk1, considers it a replay iff decryption succeeds and the obtained
plaintext 0l1 ||x′ was encrypted by the simulator before, (in this case, σpk1 conditionally forwards
the respective message to the chosen user), and, if the message is not a replay, the ciphertext is
decrypted with the key of the indicated recipient and injected into the channel.
To prove that σpk1 is universal, we describe a reduction R that has a “forward” and a
“random” mode. R connects to either the real-world system or the ideal-world system (like
a distinguisher). In “forward” mode, R only relays all inputs and outputs. In “random”
mode, however, it will replace plaintexts in exactly the same manner as σpk1 . The reduction R
chooses either “forward” or “random” mode with probability 12 each, and in “random” mode
inverts the distinguisher’s guess. R turns any distinguisher that achieves with q queries an
advantage ε between the real-world system and the ideal-world system with simulator σpk1 into
a distinguisher between the real-world system and the ideal-world system with an arbitrary
simulator. The latter distinguisher makes 2q queries and has an advantage of ε2 − q
2
2l
.
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Now we describe reductions R1,R2, and R3 as follows. Reductions R1 and R2 use adver-
saries A1,A2 against IND-RCCA resp. IK-RCCA-security. The reduction R1 outputs pk1 as a
key to A1, while R2 outputs pk1, pk2 to A2. The reduction R1 handles A1’s challenge query
(m0,m1) by transmitting mb for a random bit b to B1 and returning the ciphertext to A1; R2
sends the given message to either B1 or B2, depending on a random bit u, and also returns
the result. The output of each Ai for i = 1, 2 is denoted di, and the reductions output b ⊕ d1
or u ⊕ d2, respectively. If Ri interacts with the real-world system in either case, it emulates
the underlying game, IND-RCCA and resp. IK-RCCA; else, if it interacts with the ideal-world
system with simulator σpk1 the view of Ai is statistically independent of the bit b resp. u, which
shows equations (5) and (6).
The last reduction R3 runs a WROB-CCA-adversary A3; it has to choose two users from the
set of N¯ receivers to associate keys pk1 and pk2 with (the other users get “fresh” simulated key
pairs). Thus, R3 must guess for which users robustness will be violated (losing a factor N¯
2)—if
A3 corrupts either of these users or runs the GameOutput oracle for users other than the
selected ones, then R3 will output a random bit. Ciphertexts are decrypted with the simulated
keys for all but the guessed indices, and else forwarded to the selected users. If the guessed
users are correct (i.e. neither are corrupted and they are used as input for the GameOutput
oracle) then the message input to GameOutput is forwarded to the first input user, and the
ciphertext is forwarded to both users. The output is either 0, if both users output messages,
and 1 otherwise. This results in equation (7).
4.3 Anonymity with Strong Robustness
Strong robustness (SROB-CCA, [ABN10]) is strictly stronger than weak robustness. Intuitively,
whereas weak robustness states that honestly generated ciphertexts are not decryptable by two
distinct receivers, strong robustness requires this even for adversarially generated ciphertexts.
A strongly robust scheme will of course also be sufficient to achieve − ? / ••, in Theorem 4.3 (see
below) we even achieve better bounds in the reduction. Intuitively, due to the exact definition
of the oracles in the games, the reduction to SROB-CCA can exploit every inconsistency in an
emulated interaction with the distinguisher, whereas the reduction to WROB-CCA has to guess
when the inconsistency will occur.
Somewhat surprisingly, strong robustness does not provide a “qualitatively” better security
guarantee than weak robustness. (“Qualitative” refers to the properties of the resources, in
contrast to the “quantitative” reduction tightness.) This is particularly relevant since obtaining
a WROB-CCA secure scheme from a non-robust one is easier than obtaining an SROB-CCA
one [ABN10].
To some extent, the fact that the “qualitative” guarantees of weak and strong robustness
coincide stems from the assumed resource / . Since / allows the adversary to inject arbitrary
ciphertexts to arbitrary receivers, there is no incentive to send the same (faked) ciphertext to two
or more different users; the adversary could also send different ciphertexts. Technically, from a
network that allows the adversary to inject one message to multiple receivers more “easily” than
it allows him to inject different messages, a strongly robust scheme indeed achieves a “better”
resource than a weakly robust one; in the weakly robust case the adversary can inject messages
to several receivers “easily,” in the strongly robust case only to one. We think, however, that
such a network guarantee (injecting several different messages is more difficult) would have to be
justified by a particular application and should not be the focus of a general-purpose discussion
as ours.
Theorem 4.3. An encryption scheme that is IND-CCA-, 1-sided-IK-CCA-, and SROB-CCA-
secure constructs − ? / •• from / and (←−•)n with respect to static corruption. More formally,
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for each C ⊆ [n], there exist a simulator σ′ and reductions Anq(·), A′q(·), A′′q (·),A′′′nq(·) such
that
∆D
(
pke⊥E
[
q/ ,←−•n] ,⊥E( q− ? / ••)) ≤ ΓAnq(D) (Gs-rob) , (8)
and
∆D
(
pke
[
q/ C ,←−•nC] , σ′E( q− ? / •• C))
≤ qn · ΦA′q(D)
(
Gind-cca
)
+ qn · ΦA′′q (D)
(
G1-sided-ik-cca
)
+ ΓA
′′′
nq(D)
(
Gs-rob
)
. (9)
Proof sketch. The reductions we describe for this proof are less efficient in terms of queries than
our other reductions; however, they are tighter than the proofs using WROB-CCA. The proof
of equation (8) follows that of Theorem 3.2; we use the same MES (which becomes true once
a given pair (m, i) provokes that one user other than i outputs a message), and the real-world
and ideal-world systems are equivalent as long as the MES is false. Yet, using WROB-CCA,
we lost a factor qn as we had to guess the correct query and user for breaking robustness in
advance; this was because the GameOutput oracle takes as input the plaintext m which has
to be honestly encrypted. Using SROB-CCA, we can simply encrypt each message m sent by
the distinguisher via the A-interface, and decrypt it using the keys of all the receivers other
than the intended one. If any of these decryptions result in m′ 6= ♦, then the ciphertext can be
used in the SROB-CCA GameOutput-oracle.
To show equation (9), we use the simulator σ in Theorem 3.2, the simulator (call it σ′ here)
and reductions A′q and A′′q of Eq. (4) in Theorem 4.1, and a reduction A′′′nq which we sketch
below, turning a successful distinguisher between σ′E− $ / •• and σE− ? / •• into an adversary
against SROB-CCA. This last part is done by means of the MES used in Theorem 3.2, which
becomes true if a simulated message ck sent to a user that was not its intended recipient, yields
output at this user. We argue that σE− ? / •• and σ′E− $ / •• are equivalent unless if the MES
is true, and show that MES becomes true only if SROB-CCA is broken. The reduction A′′′nq
creates n+1 key pairs in the SROB-CCA-game (n for users and 1 auxiliary key p˜k to emulate the
outputs of σE− ? / •• and σ′E− $ / ••). “Fresh” ciphertexts are decrypted using the corresponding
decryption oracles; if the MES becomes true and one non-fresh ciphertext results mj 6= ♦ for
some receiver other than the intended one, the SROB-CCA-game can easily be won.
5 Conclusion and Possible Extensions
We analyzed the problem of achieving confidentiality for a receiver-anonymous channel; our
results are the constructive counterpart of the notions discussed in [BBDP01, ABN10]. In
particular, we showed that confidentiality, key privacy, and weak robustness are indeed sufficient
for such a scheme to be useful, and that (slightly relaxed versions of) these are indeed necessary.
We have also discussed why strong robustness is not necessary in this context. Our results do
not only support the trust in existing schemes and constructions; they also show that the simpler
and more efficient weakly robust schemes (see [ABN10]) can be used safely.
Our constructive statements help explore the boundary between cryptography and traf-
fic analysis. For example, an (active) instance of the latter, conditional delivery, cannot be
prevented by end-to-end encryption (even if it has all the properties we suggest); indeed coun-
termeasures against such attacks at the application level are critical to provide any meaningful
traffic analysis resistance. Our ideal resource, thus, does not yet correspond directly to the
black-box system models used by traffic analysis research, but is a component upon which such
a model could be based. In contrast to our model here, traffic analysis frameworks usually
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consider restricted attackers that observe only parts of the system and a probabilistic model for
sender and receiver behavior.9
Protocols in which encrypted messages are processed by multiple parties can, to some extent,
prevent conditional deliveries. In a MIX-network, for instance, the attacker cannot direct a
multi-layered ciphertext at a particular recipient, as he will be unable to remove the outer
ciphertext layers. Thus receiver-anonymous communication using onions, threshold decryption,
or verifiable re-randomization bypasses our impossibility result, instead requiring additional
(distributed) trust in third parties.
Our study of anonymity properties of end-to-end encryption is only a first step in the
constructive modeling of resources with useful anonymity properties and constructions thereof.
The general paradigm of examining the security of anonymity-preserving cryptographic schemes
in a constructive manner can (and should) be applied to other schemes as well, including topics
such as anonymous signature schemes and key-exchange protocols.
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A The Composition Theorem
We describe the composition of protocols and formulate the composition theorem in constructive
cryptography. Formally, for multiple converters ψ(1), . . . , ψ(m) we write [ψ(1), . . . , ψ(m)] for the
parallel composition, and it generally holds that
[ψ(1), . . . , ψ(m)]
I [R1, . . . ,Rm] = [ψ
I
(1)R1, . . . , ψ
I
(m)Rm]
for all R1, . . . ,Rm. Moreover, any two converters ψ, φ ∈ Σ can be composed sequentially by
connecting the inside interface of the one converter ψ to the outside interface of φ. This is
denoted as ψ ◦ φ and it holds that (ψ ◦ φ)IR = ψI(φIR) for all resources R. We extend both
notations to protocols, i.e., we write ψ ◦ pi or [pi(1), . . . ,pi(m)] and mean that the respective
operations apply to all converters individually. We also make use of a special converter id
that behaves transparently (i.e., allows access to the underlying interface of the resource). The
protocol where all parties have to converter id is denoted id.
This composition theorem here resembles the one in [MT10], but is phrased such that it
applies to settings where one does not assume that the distinguisher class is closed under
absorption of converters or resources, such as concrete security notions. The proof follows the
same steps as the one in [MT10]. For the statement of the theorem we assume the operation
[·, . . . , ·] to be left-associative; in this way we can simply express multiple resources using the
single variable U.
Theorem A.1 (Composition for the n-party setting with explicit adversary). Let R, S, T,
and U be resources. Let pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) and ψ = (ψ1, . . . , ψn) be protocols (such that pi is
intended to construct S from the resource R and ψ is intended to construct T from S).
For each distinguisher D, denote by D′ the distinguisher that runs D but emulates ψi at
interface Ii for all i ∈ [n], and by D′′ the distinguisher that runs D and emulates σpi at interface
E. Then, for all D,
∆D
(
(ψ ◦ pi)R, (σpi ◦ σψ)ET
) ≤ ∆D′ (piR, σEpi S)+ ∆D′′ (ψS, σEψT) , and
∆D
(⊥E(ψ ◦ pi)R,⊥ET) ≤ ∆D′ (⊥EpiR,⊥ES)+ ∆D (⊥EψS,⊥ET) .
For each distinguisher D, let D′′′ be the distinguisher that runs D and additionally emulates a
concurrent execution of U. Then, for all D,
∆D
(
[pi, id][R,U], [σpi, id]
E [S,U]
)
≤ ∆D′′′ (piR, σEpi S) , and
∆D
(
⊥E [pi, id][R,U],⊥E [R,U]
)
≤ ∆D
′′′ (⊥EpiR,⊥ES) .
The similar argument holds with respect to [id,pi], [U,S], and [U,R].
If one considers classes of distinguishers that are closed under composition with converters,
that is D◦Σ ⊆ D, and pi constructs S from the resource R within ε1 and ψ constructs T from S
within ε2, then ψ ◦ pi constructs T from R within ε1 + ε2, [pi, id] constructs [S,U] from [R,U]
within ε1, and [id,pi] constructs [U,S] from [U,R] within ε1.
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